A Proved Breed of Watchdogs Is Available

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, May 23-The rccent crop of critical books and artieles on eovert operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, principally with respect to the U-2 flight, which was downed in Soviet Russia, and the invasion of Cuba, which was repulsed by Premier Castro, has nourished proposals for a Congressional watchdog committee of the C.I.A. Its new Director, John A. McCone, who took office after these events, has already told Congress he has no objection to the establishment of this committee, having worked very well with one when he was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Presumably, therefore, unless President Kennedy should object to a C. I. A. watchdog group of Congress, and if the formula of its selection were also satisfactory to the President and to Director McCone, there would be no insurmountable Administration obstacles if Congress chose to create this new special committee. And one formula of its relection that is being discussed rems well suited to the basic resultrements of the two branches of he Federal Government involved.

Under this formula the House and the Senate would each supply a watchdog committee of nine members. The two would act separately in general and jointly when this was found desirable by both. The House group would be composed of the chairmen of the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services and Appropriations, the ranking majority members of these three and the ranking minority members. The Senate group would be formed of the chairmen of Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Appropriations, plus the ranking majority and ranking minority members. This, as in the case of the joint committee that watchdogs the A. E. C., would give control to the party majority in each branch, which currently is Democratic.

The product of this formula, in the present make-up of these committees, would be two groups of the highest caliber and seniority in Congress, with memberships of proved discretion and great influence. In the nature of the assignment, these legislators would be restrained from passing on secret information to the other members of the committees from which they were recruited. But when these parent committees were dealing with matters in which C. I. A. activities were involved, they would have authoritative guidance now denied them. The beneficial effects of this on major legislation are obvious.

The Personnel

If the nine-member groups were ehosen on the formula under discussion, only two members would encounter a problem of choice growing out of their present committee assignments. These two are Senators Russell of Georgia and Saltonstall of Massachusetts. Russell, being currently chairman of Armed Services and ranking majority member of Appropriations, would have a double eligibility of service on the C. I. A. watchdog committee. So would Saltonstall, because he is the ranking minority member on both Appropriations and Armed Services.

The indicated solution would be for Senators Byrd of Virginia and Stennis of Mississippi, who rank after Russell on Armed Services, to become its two majority members on the watchdog group. And Saltonstail's choice would be between his two ranking minority memberships, making room thereby for either Senator Young of North Dakota or Senator Smith of Maine.

The watchdog committees would then be composed of the following: (House) Chairman Cannon, Representatives Mahon and Taber, from Appropriations; Chairman Vinson, Representatives Rivers and Arends, from Armed Services; and Chairman Morgan, Representatives Zablocki and Chipperfield, from Foreign Affairs. (Senate) Chairman Hayden, Senator Russell and either Senator Saltonstall or Young, from Appropriation; Scnators Byrd, Stennis and either Senator Saltonstail or Smith, from Armed Services; and Chairman Fulbright, Senators Sparkman and Wiley, from Foreign Relations.

Either Senate combination, and the House group which encounters no similar problem of selection, would provide two C. I. A. watchdog committees of exceptional quality. And the sense of "mission" that the creation of such committees imparts would be a shield against uniformed criticism that C. I. A. greatly needs, and a filter of the information Congress should have in the public interest.

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